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“The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive
at those universal elementary laws from which
the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction.”
Albert Einstein, 1918.
When researching the natural world, scientists often
search for universal principles or laws to explain the sys-
tematic working of things. This approach has served
them well, but can it be applied to disciplines outside
the natural sciences? Are there universal laws, for exam-
ple, that underlie social and economic phenomena, and
should economists search for such laws? I believe the an-
swer is yes, and that it is advantageous for economists
to adopt methods from the natural sciences to uncover
them.
In the natural sciences, universal laws are discovered
through data and experimentation, often by searching
for regularities that hold under a wide range of circum-
stances. This approach is rarely used in economics. In-
stead, economic theories are often based on assumptions
about how the world should be and how agents should be-
have, e.g., agents are assumed to be perfectly rational and
markets are considered complete and in equilibrium[1].
This means that in much of economic theory, the univer-
sal principles that underlie phenomena are agreed upon
a priori, rather than discovered through empirical anal-
ysis. It also means that theories are often accepted and
advanced based on mathematical elegance or rigor rather
than correspondence with data.
This method may seem strange to scientists, but there
are several good reasons why economists have adopted
it. First, economic systems are mutable. We are part of
economic systems after all, and unlike particles, we can
change our behavior or the rules of the game to corre-
spond with how things should be. Second, there is some-
thing compelling about thinking that economic systems
are okay—that they are in the hands of rational agents
and have a robust structure such that things are stable.
Finally, these theories serve as reference points to under-
stand the world. It’s interesting to know if and when
economic phenomena depart from these theories because
it suggests we have work to do.
Complementary to this methodology, however, can be
the methodology of the natural sciences, where emphasis
is placed on finding regularities in data, and where the
underlying cause is expressed in the form of some univer-
sal principle or law that is repeatedly tested. Sometimes
the underlying cause will correspond with what we orig-
inally thought it should be, but sometimes it may not.
To illustrate what I mean, consider the way that prices
move in financial markets.
RANDOM WALKS
Over a century ago, the French mathematician Louis
Bachelier proposed that stock prices follow a random
walk—that prices move up or down in random increments
such that price changes are unpredictable[2]. When an-
alyzing economic data, the random walk model is sur-
prisingly accurate. It holds not only for stock prices, but
also for the prices of many other items: stock indices,
derivative instruments, commodities and other economic
goods, and even for the prices of contracts traded on pre-
diction markets. The regularity of this behavior across
different items hints that some fundamental mechanism
is behind it; perhaps some universal principle is at work.
In fact, most economists believe this is true, and they
attribute the randomness of prices to the profit max-
imization (or loss aversion) of investors. If prices did
not move randomly, but instead were in some way pre-
dictable, then this predictability would be quickly re-
moved. After all, who would be willing to sell a stock
for $90 if everyone knew the price would move up to
$100 during the next period? Wouldn’t sellers try to get
something closer to $100 right now, and wouldn’t buy-
ers be willing to pay something closer to $100? When
these individuals push the price to $100, the predictabil-
ity in the price movement is removed. If predictable
price movements quickly disappear, then the only way for
prices to move is with random increments. Paul Samuel-
son, an American economist, derived this result in his
paper entitled “Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices
Fluctuate Randomly”[3]. It is an elegant and simple ex-
planation for the universally observed random nature of
price movements. The theory explains a large collection
of phenomena and has predictive power (it predicts that
any prices determined by profit maximizing agents will
be random)—both are hallmarks of theories developed
by seeking universal laws.
EXTREME PRICE MOVEMENTS
There is another interesting regularity found in eco-
nomic prices: very large price movements, such as stock
market crashes, occur frequently[4–6]. This, again, hap-
pens across the board for many different economic items.
To understand just how large these price movements
are, consider what it would mean if human heights be-
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FIG. 1: (a) The probability distribution of daily returns for the S&P 500 stock index from January 3, 1950 to November 25,
2009. Inset: Probability that the absolute daily return is above a threshold value, x. The five largest absolute returns are
circled and their dates and sizes are shown. (b) The rescaled probability distribution of daily returns for six different traded
items. Adapted from [7].
haved in a similar way. Assume for a moment that adult
human heights varied between individuals in the same
way that price movements vary. Within your circle of
friends, there wouldn’t be that much of a difference; most
people would be between 5 to 6 ft tall. Outside of this cir-
cle, however, there would be dramatic changes. In your
city, someone would be over 30 ft tall. In your coun-
try, the tallest person would likely reach 150 ft, and the
tallest person in the world would be over 1000 ft tall.
The distinction between human heights and price
movements is not just a pedagogical exercise, it is impor-
tant because most financial models assume that the dis-
tribution of stock returns is the same as the distribution
pattern for human heights – the ubiquitous bell-shaped
curve known as the normal (or Gaussian) distribution. If
this were the case, very large returns (analogous to a 150
foot person) should never occur. But this is incorrect.
For reasons we do not fully understand, stock returns
are not distributed according to a normal distribution.
Instead, they have a much larger peak and the ‘tails’ or
extremes of the distribution are thicker. This means that
large price movements occur more often than predicted.
In Fig. 1(a), I show the distribution for the daily re-
turns of the S&P 500 stock index from January 3, 1950 to
November 25, 2009. This plot can be replicated by down-
loading data from http://finance.yahoo.com. The hori-
zontal axis measures the different sizes of returns (0.02 is
a 2% return, 0.04 is a 4% return, etc.) and the vertical
axis shows the relative likelihood of these price changes
– the higher the red bar, the more likely that event is ob-
served. Small returns, close to zero, are the most likely
occurrence. A normal distribution is fit to the data and
is drawn with a black line. Notice that this does not
coincide well with the S&P 500 data.
The inset plot shows the probability that a daily return
is above a certain threshold value. It enlarges the tail of
the distribution—the area where large price movements
are recorded. You can see that the probability of large
returns is much higher than what the normal distribution
predicts, i.e., the red curve is above the black curve for
large values of x. I’ve circled the five highest returns
and show their values and the dates they were observed.
Not surprisingly, the largest return occurred on Black
Monday, October 19, 1987, when stock markets crashed
around the world.
If you look at the y-axis in the inset plot, the prob-
ability for a daily return to exceed 10% is around
10−4, which means this has occurred approximately once
out of 1/10−4 = 10, 000 trading days, or once every
40 years. For comparison, the black curve—a normal
distribution—predicts this to occur once every 7 × 1018
years, which is longer than the age of the universe and
for all practical purposes, means never. Obviously this is
incorrect.
One way to explain the discrepancy between observed
stock returns and financial models is to consider large
price movements as outliers—surprising events outside
of the normal model. There are several reasons to do
this. First, there are good underlying reasons to assume
a normal distribution for returns as a first guess, and
there is no accepted theory for why it should be other-
wise. Second, we usually explain large price movements
in this way—stock markets crashed because computer
trading malfunctioned or the global financial crises oc-
curred because banks made large mistakes. When us-
ing these explanations, we implicitly suggest that they
are one-time events—outliers—that can be accounted for
and controlled in the future. The problem is, despite our
efforts, they keep happening.
An alternative explanation is that something more fun-
3damental is producing these events and that the widely
reported and agreed-upon culprits are just symptoms of
the same underlying cause. There are several reasons
to believe this is true. First, extreme price movements
are not just observed for stocks; these events occur uni-
versally across traded items. Second, the empirical evi-
dence does not show these events as statistical outliers.
You can see this for the S&P 500 index in the inset plot
where the red curve extends continuously in a smooth
way down to the points where extreme price movements
are recorded. These points do not exist by themselves
but nicely fit where you’d expect them when extrapolat-
ing the red curve from smaller price movements. Finally,
there is evidence that the probability distribution of price
returns is universal, that it deviates from the normal dis-
tribution in the exact same way for different items and
over different time periods[7, 8]. In Fig. 1(b), I show the
probability distribution for daily returns for five differ-
ent traded items. By appropriately rescaling the axes for
each, the distributions collapse on the same non-normal
curve. Why would these unrelated price series behave
in the same way unless something fundamental was the
cause?
Despite the idiosyncratic behavior of individuals, regu-
larities exist in social and economic systems that are sim-
ilar to those found in natural systems. Specific examples
are found in the way that economic prices behave. The
reason prices are random is well understood; it occurs
because individuals are profit maximizing. The reason
prices deviate from a normal distribution is not under-
stood and is currently a matter of much debate. I believe
the evidence suggests some universal mechanism under-
lies these deviations, and that large price movements are
not outliers to an otherwise correct (normal) model. If
true, understanding this mechanism is extremely impor-
tant. If large price movements result from human behav-
ior or the way in which markets are structured, then there
might be ways to curtail behavior or structure markets
differently such that these extreme events do not occur.
If they are due to some economic cause, then perhaps it
is something we can only understand and better prepare
for. At least then we would have correct models on which
to base economic decisions.
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